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Abstract 
This thesis examines the welfare effect of illegal immigration in a dy-
namic framework. Firstly, we examine the effect of illegal immigration 
on the domestic welfare in both one-sector and two-sector non-optimizing 
models. We show that steady state per capital consumption is likely to 
rise within non-optimizing framework. Secondly, we examine the welfare 
effect of illegal immigration in the one-sector optimizing model. We first 
consider wage is exogenous in the representative household's maximization 
problem. We next follow Hazari and Sgro (2003) to develop a one-sector 
model ami reexamine the welfare consequences of illegal immigration. In 
contrast to their negative conclusion, we obtain ambiguous welfare pre-
diction which is due to the presence of three effects at work: a positive 
exploitation effect, a negative usiiig-up-capital effect and a negative in-
tertemporal effect. We then provide numerical examples that per capita 
domestic consumption rises in the presence of illegal migration. Thirdly, 
we extend the analysis to a two-sector setup and coiitiiiiie to assume do-
mestic labor and illegal worker to be perfect substitutes in production in 
each sector. Illegal immigrants either can be sector specific or work in 
both sectors. In general, we are unable to find examples that yield a neg-
ative effect of illegal immigration on domestic welfare under reasonable 
parameterization. It is only possible to get an adverse effect on per capita 
domestic consumption when we move to very extreme parameterization. 
Our findings provide a different interpretation of the welfare criterion due 
to labor substitutability proposed in Hazari and Sgro (2003) based on 
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1 Introduction and Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis studies the welfare effect of illegal immigration in a dynamic growth 
model. Illegal immigration is a major political issue in developed countries, 
such as the United States. The common official position taken by the host 
countries is that controlling national borders against illegal entry is the solution 
to the problem. For example, illegal immigration has been the rise in the U.S. 
since the early 1970s and almost one-half of illegal immigrants are from Mexico. 
Over the last two decades, there is an increase in national spending on the U.S. 
Border Patrol from $290 million in 1980 to $ 1.7 billion in 1998 (in 1998 dollars). 
Due to the lack of official statistics, it is difficult to observe the total numbers of 
individuals that enter the country illegally. Nevertheless, it is widely believed 
that the nuinbcr of illegal immigrants in the U.S. has grown sharply over the 
period of time. Although there is some disagreement regarding these numbers, 
generally accepted figures on the stock of illegal immigrants give ranges of 2 
million to 4 million in 1980, and 3 million to 6 million in 1986 which account 
for about 5 percent of the U.S. labor force. 
Although there is a significant literature dealing with illegal immigration, 
according to my knowledge, none of the literature considers the effect of illegal 
immigrants on domestic welfare in a dynamic two-sector economy. The pioneer-
ing work on illegal immigration is the static analysis studied by Ethier (1986) 
which discusses the economic welfare of the host country that confronts the 
inflow of unskilled illegal immigrants based on the crime-theoretic approach of 
Becker (1968). There are a number of papers followed to examine the effects of 
illegal iniiuigration within a static framework. Both Bond and Chen (1987) and 
Djaj ic (1987) consider the extension to a two-country setting. It is found that 
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there is a distribution effect of illegal immigration that benefits domestic un-
skilled workers but hurts capital and skilled labor. Recently, Bandyopadliyay 
and Baii(lyopadhya.y (1998) analyze the supply-side or source-country deter-
minants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model. 
Leviiie (1999) indicates that illegal immigration control can deliver welfare ben-
efits when compared with laissez-faire policy in a Harris-Todaro type model. In 
a North-South trade model with heterogenous labor (skilled versus unskilled), 
Gaytan and Larhiri (1999) reverse the common belief that foreign aid always 
reduces illegal immigration through the elimination of welfare differential be-
tween destination and sending countries. In a. static trade model, Chesney 
and Harzari (2003) show that unskilled illegal migrants help to maintain and 
lower the relative price of the non-traded goods that tourists consume thereby 
helping tourism. Adopting the efficiency wage hypothesis in the labor market, 
Koiidoli (2004) indicates that strengthening border enforcement policy is wel-
fare enhancing to native workers due to the outcomes of higher wages, higher 
iiiieniploynieiit allowances and higher employment. 
There are only a few studies on illegal immigration within a. dynamic frame-
work. Djaj ic (1999) examines the implications of border control policies and 
iiitcnial ciiiforcemerit in a simple ad hoc dynamic model. The main conclusion is 
that efforts to control illegal immigration in the sectors where they traditionally 
find eiuploynient may increase the overall stock of illegal immigrants residing 
ill the cconoiny which contradicts the findings in earlier research. Hazari and 
Sgro (2000) develop a. two-sector non-optimizing dynamic model with illegal 
migrants to inspect the long-run growth effect of illegal migration and border 
enforcement. They show that the steady-state growth path with migrants may 
lie above or below the original balanced growth path with zero migrants. If the 
balanced growth path shifts up, this implies the economy can grow at a faster 
rate with illegal migration and we can generate a. higher rate of balanced growth 
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by relaxing the border enforcement. Finally, following the Ramsey tradition, 
Hazari and Sgro (2003) develop a one-sector optimizing dynamic model with 
two factor of production (labor and capital) to investigate the welfare effects 
of illegal migration. Hazari and Sgro show that the net impact on domestic 
consumption depends on the degree of substitution between illegal migrant and 
domestic labor. If illegal migrant and domestic labor are perfect substitutes in 
the production, the positive exploitation effect is always dominated by the neg-
ative capital using up effect and illegal migration necessarily lowers the long-run 
per capita coiisuiiiption of domestic residents. If illegal migrant and domestic 
labor are imperfect substitutes, the effect of illegal migration on the domestic 
welfare is ambiguous. However, under Cobb-Douglas production technology 
and reasonable parameterization that domestic labor force is larger than the 
total amount of illegal migrants, illegal migration raises the long-run per capita 
consuniptioii of domestic residents. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the equilibrium effects of illegal im-
niigratioii on the domestic welfare in an optimizing dynamic framework. The 
analysis contains three parts. In the first part, we examine the effect of il-
legal immigration on the domestic welfare in both one-sector and two-sector 
iion-optirniziiig models. We show that illegal immigration necessarily raises 
the resident welfare in the one-sector model and the steady state per capital 
consumption are likely to increase under reasonable parameterization in the 
two-sector non-optimizing framework. In the second part, we examine the wel-
fare effect of illegal iminigration under the one-sector optimizing model. We 
first consider wage is exogenous in the representative household's maximization 
problem. We next follow Hazari and Sgro (2003) to develop a one-sector model 
and reexamine the welfare consequences of illegal immigration. In contrast to 
their finding that "illegal migration necessarily lowers the long run per capita 
consumption of domestic residents" (p. 142), we obtain ambiguous welfare pre-
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diction and are able to decompose it as the net outcome of several contrasting 
effects at work. In addition, under reasonable parameterization, we can pro-
vide a numerical example that per capita domestic consumption rises in the 
presence of illegal migration. In the third part, we extend the analyses in the 
previous part to a two-sector setup. We continue to assume domestic labor 
and illegal worker to be perfect substitutes in production. Illegal immigrants 
either can be sector specific or work in both sectors. Following our benchmark 
parameterization used in the one-sector case, we are unable to find a negative 
effect of illegal immigration on domestic per capita consumption or welfare. It 
is only possible to get an adverse effect on per capita domestic consumption 
when we move to very extreme parameterization. In summary, we conclude 
that the welfare criterion due to labor substitutability proposed in Hazari and 
Sgro (2003) may not be directly applicable in a multi-sector setting, but the 
economic implication is insightful. 
The reinaiiicler of the thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter 1.2 reviews 
the literature on the illegal immigration. Chapter 2 examines the effect of 
the presence of illegal immigrants on the domestic welfare in non-optimizing 
framework. Chapter 3 examines the welfare effect of illegal immigration un-
der the one-sector optimizing model with exogenous wage and reexamines the 
Hazari and Sgro model with illegal migrants. Chapter 4 discusses the welfare 
effect of illegal immigration under two-sector optimizing setting while Chapter 
5 concludes. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The pioneering work on illegal immigration is the static analysis studied by 
Ethier (1986) which discusses the economic welfare of the host country that 
confronts the inflow of unskilled illegal immigrants based on the crime-theoretic 
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approach of Becker (1968). There are a number of papers followed to examine 
the effects of illegal immigration within a static framework. 
Recently, Goto (1998) examines the economic impact of illegal unskilled mi-
grant workers in japan. Under the C G E model established by Goto, total welfare 
effect is divided into four sub-effects including a positive cheaper foreign labor 
effect and three negative sub-effects namely trade barrier effect, nontradable in-
come effect as well as nontradable consumption effect. It is shown that if Japan 
is to benefit from admitt ing foreign labor, the scale of admission should be large 
and the admission should be accompanied by trade liberalization. 
Levine (1999) examines the welfare issue of immigration control in a Harris-
Todaro type model which is a one good model with three types of factor input. 
Unlike the original H-T model which labor market in the rural sector is cleared, 
in this model, neither bloc (East and West) is characterized by labor market 
clearing and wage is partially flexible. For welfare analysis, the output of East 
and West of two equilibriums (laissez-faire migration equilibrium and social 
optimal equilibrium) is compared. Laissez-faire equilibrium based on explicit 
calculations of potential migrants without immigration controls in the West and 
social optimal equilibrium based on the maximization of the net total output 
by choosing the expenditure on immigration control. The main finding is that 
immigration control can deliver welfare benefits when compared with laissez-
faire. 
Gaytan and Larhiri (1999) develop a two-country international trade model 
to examine the effect of foreign aid on illegal immigration. The endowment of 
labor in the North is composed of skilled labor and unskilled labor which there 
is only unskilled type labor in the South. The main result is that a transfer of 
resources from border control to foreign aid will increase illegal immigration if 
the initial level of aid is sufficiently small which is act counter to the common be-
lief that foreign aid always reduces illegal migration through welfare differential 
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elimination between destination and sending countries. 
In a static trade model, Chesney and Hazari (2003) develop a three goods sta-
tic trade model to establish a relationship between illegal migrants and tourism 
and examine the impact of an increase in tourism on the inflow of illegal mi-
grants and resident welfare. They assume illegal workers are sector specific to 
the non-tradable good and earn less than local workers. The main conclusion is 
that unskilled illegal migrants help to maintain and lower the relative price of 
the non-traded goods that the tourists consume thereby helping tourism. Also, 
an expansion in tourist trade with the condition that one of the traded sectors 
is capital intensity and the non-traded sector is labor intensity necessarily raises 
resident welfare and employment and lowers the welfare of the illegal migrants. 
There are only a few studies on illegal immigration within a dynamic frame-
work. Djaj ic (1999) examines the implications of border control policies and 
internal enforcement in a simple ad hoc dynamic model. In order to focus the 
intersectoral migration, illegal workers are assumed to be present in both the 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors. It is also assumed that the agriculture 
sector is an old location for illegal workers with higher probability of deporta-
tions but higher expected wage, while the manufacturing sector is a new location 
with lower probability of deportations but lower expected wage. The main con-
clusion is that efforts to control illegal immigration in the sectors where they 
traditionally find employment may trigger the formation of networks support-
ing illegal workers in new locations and occupations where the probability of 
detection is relatively lower. As a result, the overall stock of illegal immigrants 
residing in the economy may increase which contradicts the findings in earlier 
research. 
Hazari and Sgro (2000) develop a two-sector non-optimizing dynamic model 
with illegal migrants to inspect the long-run growth effect of illegal migration 
and border enforcement. In the model, domestic labor inputs can work in both 
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sectors but are relatively more productive in one of the sectors. On the other 
hand, illegal migrants are sector specific to the sector where domestic labor is 
less productive. These assumptions then give rise to a production possibility 
curve that lies partially inside the zero migration production possibility frontier 
when we have illegal migrants in the economy. The steady-state growth path 
with migrants may lie above or below the original balanced growth path with 
zero migrants. If the balanced growth path shifts up, this implies the economy 
can grow at a faster rate with illegal migration and we can generate a higher 
rate of balanced growth by relaxing the border enforcement. 
Finally, following the Ramsey tradition, Hazari and Sgro (2003) develop a 
one-sector optimizing dynamic model with two factor of production (labor and 
capital) to investigate the welfare effects of illegal migration. Illegal migrants 
are assumed to receive a wage below the normal wage of domestic labor and 
they consume all of their income. The presence of illegal migrants has two 
effects oil the domestic welfare: the exploitation effect and the capital-using-up 
effect. The former effect occurs because illegal migrants are paid a lower wage 
so that domestic residents earn some rent which can be consumed and/or saved. 
However, some capital is used up in producing output for the consumption of 
migrants which is captured by the latter effect. Hazari and Sgro show that 
the net impact on domestic consumption depends on the degree of substitution 
between illegal migrant and domestic labor. If illegal migrant and domestic 
labor are perfect substitutes in the production, the positive exploitation effect 
is always dominated by the negative capital using up effect and illegal migration 
necessarily lowers the long-run per capita consumption of domestic residents. 
If illegal migrant and domestic labor are imperfect substitutes, the effect of 
illegal migration on the domestic welfare is ambiguous. However, under Cobb-
Douglas production technology and reasonable parameterization that domestic 
labor force is larger than the total amount of illegal migrants, illegal migration 
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raises the long-run per capita consumption of domestic residents. 
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2 Non-optimizing Model with Illegal Migrants 
In chapter 2.1, we develop a one-sector dynamic non-optimizing model with 
illegal immigrants. We next extend the one-sector model to a two-sector setting 
to examine the welfare effect of illegal immigration. We consider there are two 
factors of production, labor and capital which production is under standard 
neoclassical technology. 
2.1 One-sector Non-optimizing Model 
2.1.1 Illegal Migrants 
Throughout this thesis, we consider illegal immigrants take the following fea-
tures. Following Hazari and Sgro (2003), we assume the illegal immigrants are 
paid a wage below that of domestic labor. 
Wm = I3W (1) 
where Wm denotes the wage rate for the illegal immigrants and (3 is the dif-
ferential factor which is exogenously given. We assume domestic labors are 
paid a wage above the illegal immigrants which imply the differential factor fi 
is smaller than one and larger than zero (0 < ^ < 1). As ^ decreases, the wage 
difference between domestic labor and illegal immigrant increases. Moreover, 
for simplicity, we assume the amount of illegal immigrants in the economy is 
exogenously given. Following Hazari and Sgro (2003), we further assume illegal 
iinmigraiits consume all of their income and they do not save or invest. We 
also assume illegal immigrant and domestic labor are perfect substitutes. 
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2.1.2 Production 
The economy produces a single good F with the help of domestic labor, capital 
and illegal immigrant. We assume there is perfection substitution between 
illegal and domestic labor in the production. The production function is given 
below: 
F = F{K, L + M) (2) 
where K is the capita stock, L is the total labor force and M denotes illegal 
immigrant. 
Subtracting the total payments to illegal immigrants from the total output , 
we have the total income of the domestic workers (y')， 
Y' = FiK, L + M)- M^w (3) 
where M0w is the total income received by illegal immigrants. 
For the investment decision, we make the usual assumption that a constant 
fraction s{0 < s < 1) of the total income (excluding illegal immigrant income) 
is saved. 
k = sY' - 5K (4) 
where 5 is the depreciation rate and K = dK/dt which shows net investment. 
Next, we have the budget constraint which the sum of the consumption of 
residents, the consumption of illegal immigrants and the investment is equal to 
the total output of the economy. 
F{K, L + M) = C + sY' + M^w (5) 
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2.1.3 Equilibrium Analysis 
At the steady state, the per capita consumption of the residents is 
f n 4- A 
c* = (1 - s) ^ ^ k* (6) 
V s 
where c = C/L is the per capita consumption and k = K/L which denotes 
the per capita, capital. We assume the populat ion growth rate L/L is equal 
to n. Note that in the one-sector non-optimizing model, the steady state per 
capita consumption c* and k* are positively related. To gain further insights, 
we simplify our analysis by adopt ing the Cobb-Douglas production technology 
for F 
F{k,l+m) = Ak^'il+my-" (7) 
where m = M/L.‘ 
At the steady state, the net investment is equal to zero and this implies 
- / \ • 
4 s l - p ( l - a ) { ^ ^ 1 ( l + m ) i - " = (n + 5)/ci-" (8) 
V 1 +爪乂 J 
where k = K/L, m = M/L. Let the term in left hand side be We 
differentiate 屯 (m) with respect to m , 
少 ' (m) = As{l - a ) ( l + m ) - " {1 - /3{1 - a ) } > 0 (9) 
^ We assume the domestic population growth rate L / L is equal to n. By definition, 
771 = M/L is the "illegal migrants-domestic worker" ratio. A constant "illegal migrants-
domestic worker" ratio implies the growth rate of illegal immigrants is equal to the population 
growth rate of the host country. 
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Total differentiating (8) with respect to m and k, we have 
^'{m)dm = (1 - a ) ( n + k)k-''dk (10) 
and this implies 
dk* _ nm) Q ( 
dm ~ il-a){n + 5)k-^ 、、 
and 
‘ = ( l _ s ) ( ^ ― j (1 一… ( n + J ” 〉 。 (12) 
As a result, in the one-sector non-optimizing model with illegal immigrants, 
as the amount of illegal immigrants increase, both the steady per capita, con-
sumption and the steady state capital stock increase. Note that the steady state 
per capita consumption c* and k* are positively related. By equation (11)，we 
can conclude that the presence of the illegal immigrants raises k* hence the 
steady state per capita consumption increases. In the one-sector non-optimizing 
model, illegal immigration always benefits the domestic residents in the sense 
that steady state per capita, consumption increases. 
2.2 Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants 
in Consumption Sector 
We assume illegal immigrant is specific to the production of consumption good. 
I.e. Consumption good is produced with the help of domestic labor, illegal 
immigrant and capital. Note that domestic labor and illegal immigrant are 
perfectly substitutable in the sector. 
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2.2.1 Production 
The economy produces consumption good F with the help of domestic labor, 
capital and illegal immigrant. Under the assumption of perfection substitution 
between illegal and domestic labor within the specified sector, domestic labor 
and illegal immigrant are perfect substitutes in the consumption sector. The 
production function of the consumption good F is given below: 
F = F { K l , L l + M ) (13) 
where K^ denotes capital used in the consumption sector, L]. denotes domestic 
labor iiiput to the consumption sector, M denotes illegal immigrant. 
Iiivestnient good G is produced by domestic labor and capital only. The 
production function of the investment good G is given below: 
G = G{K^ - K l L - L l ) (14) 
where K^ denotes total capital stock and L denotes total domestic labor. 
By the definitions of domestic consumption and payments to illegal iriimi-
graiits, we know that domestic consumption equals 
C i = F{KlLl + M) - MI3F2 (15) 
where C^ is the total consumption of domestic residents, M p F 2 is the total 
income received by illegal immigrants, F2 is the normal wage rate and is the 
differential factor.:. 
We assume the existence of an interior solution and perfect factor mobility 
2 We use numerical subscripts to denote partial derivatives. 
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of both domestic labor and capital. These imply wage rate(t/;) and rental rate 
(r) of the two sectors in term of the same commodity are identical. 
w = + M ) = G2{K ' - K l L - L l ) (16) 
r = P F i i K l L l + M)= - K I L - L I ) (17) 
where P is the relative price of consumption good in term of investment good. 
2.2.2 Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital 
The total output of the economy (Y) in term of investment good is equal to 
r = + M ) + G { K ' - K l L - L l ) (18) 
The above expression includes the income of immigrants. We can obtain the 
total income excluding the income of illegal immigrants by subtracting the total 
payments to illegal inimigrants. Let Y' be the total income of the domestic 
workers. 
Y' = PF{KlLl + M) + - L - Ll) - PMI3F2 (19) 
For the investment decision, we make the usual assumption tlmt a constant 
fraction s(0 < 5 < 1) of the total income (excluding illegal immigrant income) 
is saved. As a result, the law of motion for capita is 
k ^ = s y ' — (20) 
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2.2.3 Equilibrium Analysis 
The system approaches a balanced growth path where all per capita variables 
are constant. We define the following: 
. L L M M ,91、 
2 = z z (21) 
L + M L + M L L + M M ^ ‘ 
where 2 = K^/iL + M). LjL and MjM represent the population growth rate 
of domestic labor and illegal labor, respectively. For analytical convenience, we 
further assume the domestic labor force and illegal labor grow at the same rate 
1 1 . 
L M 
i T j r n (22) 
Noted that (21) implies 
； = (23) 
Substituting (20) into (23), 
s [PFiK^Ll + M)+ G{K' — K'l, L - Ll) - PMPF^] = (n + (24) 
At the steady state, the total saving of the economy is equal to the gross in-
vestment. It should be noted that from the model setting, good F is a pure 
consumption good and good G is a pure investment good. Therefore, market 
clearing of the goods market requires the output of the investment sector equals 
to the total saving of the economy. Thus, the marketing clearing condition is 
G{K' - KlL- Ll) = s [PF{Kl,Ll + M) + G{K' - Kl,L- Lj) - PMfiF^ 
(25) 
We simplify our analysis by adopting the Cobb-Douglas production tech-
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iiologies forFHind G^ : 
F'{elklel+m) = A {elkiy + m ) “ (26) 
G H k ' — e l k l 1 - = B (fci - e l k i y (1 - e i y - ' (27) 
where ( = VJL、k^ = K\IL\、m = M / L and k^ = K^/L. 
Rewriting (24)，（25) in per capita, terms and using (26), (27), we have 
5 [ ^ A (^IklY ( e + m ) i - " + B (fci - - • 严 2 = {n+S)k' 
1 1 (28) 
(29) 
(16) and (17) imply 
Q ^l+m = 7 1-el (30) 
1 — r ^ f c i - eikl 
Rocalliiig the budget constraint, we have 
ci = A {elkiy (el + m) 1-" - mm (31) 
where c^ = C ^ / L is the per capita consumption of the domestic residents. 
Equations (28), (29), (30) and (31) form a system of equations in term of 
variables Cl, k l , k^ and c^ and that complete the model. 
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2.3 Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants 
in Investment Sector 
We assume illegal immigrants are specific to the production of investment good. 
Now, investment good is produced with domestic labor, capital and illegal im-
iiiigrarit while consumption good can be produced by domestic labor and capital 
only. 
2.3.1 Production 
The ocouoiny produces consumption good F with the help of domestic labor, 
capital only. The production function of the consumption good F is given 
below: 
F = F { K l L l ) (32) 
where K"^ denotes capital used in the consumption sector, L i denotes domestic 
labor input to the consumption sector. 
Now, investment good G is produced by domestic labor, illegal immigrant 
and capital, the production function of the investment good G is given below: 
G = - L-LI + M) (33) 
where K"^ denotes total capital stock in the economy, L denotes total labor 
supply and M denotes illegal iniiuigraiit. 
The existence of an interior solution and perfect factor mobility of both 
domestic labor and capital imply identical wage rate(ti；) and identical rental 
rate (r) between the two sectors. 
w = PF枕,Ll) = - Kl, L-LI+ M) (34) 
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r = P F , { K l L l ) = - K ^ L - L I + M ) (35) 
2.3.2 Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital 
The total income excluding the payments to illegal immigrants is equal to 
Y' = PF{Kl Ll) + — Kl,L -Ll + M)- MPG2 (36) 
Following the previous section, we assume a constant fraction 5(0 < 5 < 1) of 
the total income (excluding the income received by illegal immigrants) is saved. 
The law of motion for capita is 
k ^ = s y ' - (5/(2 (37) 
2.3.3 Equilibrium Analysis 
We define z — K"^/{L + M) and differentiate z with respect to t, 
k^ L L M M 
(38) implies 
^ = — - n (39) 
At the steady state, 
s [PF{KlLl) + _ Kl L-Ll + M)- M/3G2] = (n + (40) 
The market clearing condition of the goods market requires the output of the 
iiivestiiieiit sector equal to the total saving of the economy. Thus, the market 
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clearing condition is 
GiK'^-Kl L-Ll+M) = s [PF{Kl, L^) + 一 K^L - L】+ M ) - M/3G2] 
(41) 
We consider the production functions for consumption good and investment 
good take the Cobb-Douglas form 
= (42) 
- k l l - i l + m) = B {e — kiy {l-il+ (43) 
where 巧 = L ^ / L , k^ = KllL\、m 三 M / L and k^ 三 
Rewriting (40), (41) in per capita, terms and using the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions, we have 
s \c Cj \CJ + (44) 
+B - elkiy {l-el+ m)i” — mPG2 
s (^'ckT ( � ) i — a + 二 糾 _ 炒 c T (1 — � + m ) ^ -
B (/c2 一 ^ 2^2)7 (1 _ c + _ ml3G2 
丨 （45) 
Identical wage rate(tt;) and identical rental rate (r) imply 
a d _ ^ 1-il+m 
l - a i l k " ^ ^ ~ 1 - 7 
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Finally, we recall the budget constraint of the consumption sector 
= (47) 
where c^ = C ^ / L is the per capita consumption of domestic residents. 
Similarly, (44), (45)，(46) and (47) form a system of non-linear equations in 
term of variables €器，k"^ , k"^  and (? and that complete the model. 
2.4 Two-sector Non-optimizing Model: Illegal Migrants 
in both Sectors 
Now, we consider the case that illegal immigrants are present in both consump-
tion and investment sectors. Under this assumption, both consumption and 
invastiiient goods can be produced by domestic labor, illegal immigmnt and 
capital. Illegal immigrants are perfect substitute of domestic labor in both 
sectors. 
2.4.1 Production 
The economy produces consumption good F with the factors of production 
domestic labor, capital and illegal immigrant. The production function of the 
cousuniptioii good F is given below: 
F = F{K lL l-\-M, ) (48) 
where 1<1 denotes capital used in the consumption sector, denotes domestic 
labor input to the consumption sector, Mc denotes illegal immigrant employed 
in the consumption sector. 
Since illegal immigrants are no more sector-specific, investment good G can 
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be produced by domestic labor, capital as well as illegal immigrant. The pro-
duction function of the investment good G is given below 
G = - K【,L-L^ + M- Mc) (49) 
where K^ denotes total amount of capital stock, L denotes the total labor 
available, M denotes total stock of illegal immigrants in the economy. 
We consider the case that illegal immigrants can work in both consumption 
and investment sector. I.e. Both consumption good F and investment good G 
can be produced by domestic labor, illegal immigrant and capital. Moreover, 
domestic labor and illegal iiiimigrant are perfect substitution in the two produc-
tion sectors. The existence of an interior solution and perfect factor mobility 
of both domestic labor and capital imply 
w = P F 2 { K I , L l + Mc) = G2(/(3 - K l L - L l + M - Mc) (50) 
r = P F i i K l L l + Mc) = - K ^ , L - L l + M - M J (51) 
2.4.2 Total Output and Law of Motion for Capital 
Subtracting the total payments to illegal immigrants from the output, we obtain 
the total income of the domestic workers (y ' ) . 
(52) 
At all interior solutions, the wage rate as well as rental rate of the two sectors 
in term of the same commodity are identical. Substituting (50) into (52), Y' 
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become 
= PF{KlLl + Me) + - Kl L-Ll + M- M J - M 阳 2 (53) 
A constant fraction s(0 < s < 1) of the total income (excluding the payments 
to illegal immigrants) is saved in each period. This implies the law of motion 
for capita become, 
k ^ = s y ' - <5/(3 (54) 
2.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis 
We define 2 = K^/{L + M) and differentiate z with respect to t, 
• k^ L L M M 
z = z Z (Ob) 
L + M L +ML L +MM 、“ 
(54) implies 
- = (56) 
z K^ 
At the steady state, total saving is equal to gross investment, 
PF{K^,Ll + Mc) , , 、 
s ={n + 6)K' (57) 
+G(/(3 — K^L -Ll + M)- MPG2 
Market clearing of the goods market requires: 
G(八'3 - A'3, L-Ll + M- Mc) - MI3G2 
(58) 
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The Cobb-Douglas production functions for F ^ and 
F { k c , i l + m c ) = ( 《 ( 5 9 ) 
= — ^ ^ { ！ -ic + m-爪。”” (60) 
where 0 = Ll/L, k = K^/L, m。= MJL, m = M/L and k^ 三 K”L. 
We rewrite (57), (58) in per capita terms and apply the Cobb-Douglas pro-
ciiictioii functions above, 
s 1 = (n + 
—石c广(1 + - mjm繁-(m - mc)l3G2 
1 (61) 
s = — / ^ " ( l — 4 + m — 
+ — rrW3F2 胥 - { m - m J / ^ G s 
(62) 
Identical wage rate(tt;) and rental rate (r) imply 
a(巧 + rric) = 7 l-ic+m-rric ) 
(1 - a)kc ~ 1 - 7 P - kc 
Finally, we recall the budget constraint of the consumption sector, 
= Ak^ ie l + m j i - " — mcPF2 - (m - 饥 。 ) 阳 ( 6 4 ) 
where c"^  = C ^ / L is the per capita consumption of domestic residents. Note 
that the allocation of the illegal migrants between the sectors (I.e. rUc and 
m - mc) is determined outside the model. We assume 0 proportion of m goes 
to the coiisuniptioii sector and the rest of them (1 - 6) works in the investment 
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sector. These implies 
mc = em, 1 - m c = (1 0 < 0 < 1 (65) 
Equaticms (61)，(62), (63) and (64) form a system of non-linear equations in 
term of variables 紹，kc, k'^  and c^ and that complete the model. 
2.5 Parameterizing the Two-sector Non-optimizing Mod-
els 
Due to the iioii-liiiearity of the systems, analytical solutions are unable to obtain. 
Therefore, throughout this thesis, simulation method is applied to all two-sector 
models. In the simulations, n is set to 0.025 to meet the average population 
growth rate of the world. /5 is set to 0.8 so that the wage rate received by illegal 
migrants is 20% lower than the normal wage rate, a is set to 0.3 so that return 
to capital in the consumption sector is about 30% of the output of consumption 
sector. S is set to 0.1 so that the depreciation rate is 10% per year. We consider 
the saving rate (s) takes the value of 0.15 to match the case of Belgium which 
the saving rate is the highest among the O E C D countries, (s) takes the value 
of 0.07 which is the average sa,viiig rate of the O E C D countries and s takes the 
value of 0.02 which is the case of the United State. For simplicity A and B 
are iionnalized to unity. Also, 6 is set to 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 to examine the 
welfare effect of illegal immigration if illegal immigrants can choose to work in 
one of the sectors. In the simulations, we consider three cases, (1) investment 
sector is capital intensive (7 = 0.6), (2) investment sector is labor intensive 
(7 = 0.1) and (3) identical technologies in the two sectors (7 = 0; = 0.3) in 
order to understand the role played by relative factor intensity. In reality, the 
"illegal niigrants-doinestic worker" ratio hardly exceeds 10% in most of the host 
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countries. Therefore, for the range of m , we start from zero and up to the 20% 
level. 
2.6 Simulation Results: Two-sector Non-optimizing Mod-
els 
We use the three sets of nonlinear equations to simulate the effect of illegal immi-
gration oil the steady state per capita consumption. Table 1, table 2 and table 
3 show the simulation results under the parameterization. In all the cases, the 
presence of illegal iniinigrants is beneficial to the steady state per capital con-
sumption of domestic citizens (at least at all interior equilibria). Note the in the 
parameterization, the differential factor is set to 0.8 so that the exploitation 
of illegal migrants is only 20%. Even with this minimal level of exploitation, 
per capita, domestic consumption always rises with illegal niigrants. 
The presence of illegal immigrants takes three effects on the economy. Firstly, 
since they are paid a lower wage rate, the exploitation benefits the domestic res-
idents. Secondly, some consumption goods are consumed by illegal iinniigrants 
which lower the total consumption of the domestic residents. Thirdly, since 
illegal niigrants consume all of their income and they do not save or invest, 
illegal immigrat ion creates a negative intertemporal effect on capital accumu-
lation. Ill suiiiinary, even illegal migrants and domestic worker are perfect 
substitutes, under two-sector non-optimizing framework, the steady state per 
capita consumption is likely to rise due to illegal immigration^. 
One spccial result that we see is that the effect of illegal immigration on the 
per capita consumption of the domestic residents is indifferent between the three 
models. Also, corner solution may exist when the amount of illegal immigrants 
•'Even when we consider /3 = 0.8. I.e. The wage differential between domestic workers and 
illegal migrants is 20% only, per capita consumption does not fall. 
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is large. 
Proposit ion 1 The effect of the presence of illegal immigrant in con-
suinptioi i sector, investment sector or both sectors on the long run per capita, 
consumpt ion are identical at all interior equilibria. 
Using (28), (29), (30), (44), (45), (46) and (60), (61), (62) from chapter 2.1, 
2.2, 2.3, we put (30) into (28) and (29), (46) into (44) and (45) and (62) into 
(60) and (61) to el iminate fci’ fc^ and k^. Using the six equations, we can prove 
tha t C + m = 巧 = 约 + m c and i ^ k l = i^k^ = k- These imply the output of the 
consumpt ion good is identical in the three models for the same parameters and a 
given amoun t of illegal immigrants. At all interior solutions, (30),(46)and (62) 
must bo satisfied. This implies the total income received by illegal immigrants 
is identical since the wage rate in both sectors are the same. By the budget 
constraints (31),(47) and (63), we can conclude that c^ = c^ = c^ becausc the 
ou tpu t level of the consumption sector and the total payments received by illegal 
i inniigrajits in the three models are indifferent. 
Proposit ion 2 Corner solution may exist and it depends on the amount 
of illegal migrants and the production structure of the economy. 
Tabic 4 shows two examples of corner solution. In table 4a, we assume illegal 
i imnigTant is sector specific to consumption sector. Corner solution exists when 
m is larger than or equal to 0.35 with a = 0.95 and 7 = 0.1. This example 
shows one type of corner solutions which all the domestic residents are working 
in the investment sector with a higher normal wage rate. The basic idea is that 
the presence of illegal migrants will drive down the wage rate of the consumption 
sector. Equ i l ib r ium requires the wage rate in the two sectors become identical 
and domestic labors will shift from the consumption sector to the investment 
sector as long as the wage rate in investment sector is higher. If the amount 
of illegal migrants is huge, the wage rate in the two sectors cannot restore to 
the identical situat ion since the shifting of domestic labors from consumption 
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sector to iiivestnient sector is limited. As a result, corner solution exists. All 
the domestic residents are working in the investment sector. 
Table 4b shows another type of corner solutions which all the domestic work-
ers are working in the consuniption sector with a higher normal wage. Note 
that corner solution exists when m is larger than or equal to 0.1 with a = 0.3 
and 7 = 0.6. By the same logic, the presence of illegal migrants will drive 
clown the wage rate of the investment sector and domestic labors will shift from 
the investment sector to the consuniption sector. If the amount of illegal mi-
grants is large, the wage rate in the two sectors cannot restore to the equilibrium 
situation, then corner solution exists. 
Note the proposition 2 still hold even illegal migrants can work in either 
sector because the inflows of migrants into the sectors are still exogenously 
chosen. Strictly speaking, illegal migrants are not free to choose to work between 
the two sectors. As a result, corner solution is possible to occur in this setting. 
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3 One-sector Optimizing Model with Illegal Mi-
grants 
111 this chapter, we develop dynamic optimizing one-sector model in order to ex-
amine the effect of illegal iiiiinigrants on the domestic welfare. We first consider 
wage is exogenous in the representative household's maximization problem. The 
model captures the short run effect of illegal iinniigra.tion which the domestic 
residents take wage as given. Then, we re-exainiiie the one- sector optimizing 
model with endogenous wage which developed by Hazari and Sgro (2003). We 
consider an economy that produces a single good by two factors of production, 
labor and capital, with neoclassical production technology. 
3.1 One-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage 
3.1.1 Production 
The economy produces a single good F using domestic labor, capital and ille-
gal iimiiigrant. We assume illegal immigTaiit and domestic labor are perfect 
substitutes in the production. The production function is given below: 
F = F{K, L + M) (66) 
where K denotes capital stock of the economy, L denotes the labor force of the 
economy and M denotes illegal immigrant. Note that the economy produces a 
single good which can be used for consume or invest. 
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3.1.2 The Maximization Problem 




where c is the per capita consmnptioii (C /L ) and p represents the time dis-
count rate. We assume that the objective function only depends on the per 
capital consumption of the domestic workers and the consumption of the illegal 
immigrants is excluded due to their illegality. 
Subtracting investment and total income of the illegal iinmigrants, we have 
the domestic consumption 
C = F{K, L + M)-I- Mfiw (68) 
where C is the total coiisimiption of the domestic residents, I is the gross in-
vestment and Ml3w is the total income received by illegal immigrants. 
Rewrit ing the domestic consumption in per capita, terms and using the Cobb 
Douglas production function(7), we have 
c = ^ / . ' " ( l - I - mpw (69) 
where k 三 K/L and m = M/L. 
Domestic workers consume part of their total income and invest the rest of 
them ill each period. Therefore, the law of motion for capital is 
k = I - SK (70) 
where 6 is the depreciation rate of capital. Rewriting (70) in per capita, terms 
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and substitut ing into (69), we have the budget constraint 
k = Ak'^il + — c - (n + S)k - mpw (71) 
where n = ^ and it denotes population growth rate of the economy. 
The maximization problem is to choose c and k to maximize (67) subject 
to (71) and given k{0). The wage rate in the Hamiltonian is exogenous in the 
sense that it is taken to be given. The Hamiltonian is 
H = U{c) + + -c-{n + 6)k- mpw) (72) 
where /i is the costatc variable. The first-order conditions are 
U'{c) = (73) 
A= ( p - + m ) i - " + n +6) “ (74) 
At the steady state, fi is equation to zero, this implies 
+ = p + n + (5 (75) 
Rearranging the terms, we have 
丄 = + 7 叫 杰 (76) 
1 + m 乂 a A 乂 ^ 
whcrcK = k/{l + m ) is the capita-labor ratio of the economy. We can conclude 
that the capita-labor ratio is identical at all steady state interior equilibria, which 
the ratio is iiidepenclent of m . I.e. when there are illegal immigrants enter the 
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factor market, the investment of the economy increase and at the steady state, 
the capita-labor ratio go back to the initial level. 
At the steady state, the law of motion for capital implies 
c = + m)^- " - {n + 6)k - m/Sw (77) 
Total differentiate (75) with respect to m and k 
dk 一 Q(1 - a ) 他 " - i ( l + m ” 
Next, we differentiate the per capita, consumption c with respect to m 
dc dc dc dk 
——= 1  
dm dm dk dm 
= + (78) 
Note that (Fi -n - 5) > 0 which is equal to p. 
We conclude that illegal immigration is beneficial to the domestic labor under 
a one-sector optiiuiziiig model with exogenous wage. One special feature of the 
model is that the capital labor ratio of the economy is independent of m. When 
illegal immigrants enter the economy, the amount of labor in the economy rises. 
The domestic residents invest more and at the new steady state, the capita, 
labor ratio goes back to the initial level. This implies the changes in the steady 
state capital stock is proportional to the change in labors. Note that illegal 
iiiiiiiignuits are paid a wage rate below the normal wage rate (I.e. MPL) . As a 
result, illegal iininigration is always beneficial to the domestic residents in the 
sense that the per capita, consumption increases at the steady state. 
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3.2 One-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: 
The Hazari-Sgro Model with Illegal Migrants 
In this section, we reexamine the basic one-sector optimizing model studied 
by Hazari and Sgro (2003) where native labor and illegal migrants are perfect 
substitutes for each other in production. Our main objective is to highlight 
the conclusion that, contrary to Hazari and Sgro, illegal migration does not 
necessarily lowers the long run per capita consumption of domestic resident. 
As a result, the presence of illegal migrants does not deteriorate welfare in the 
long run. 
3.2.1 The Basic Structure 
We first provide a brief review on the basic structure of the Hazari-Sgro model. 
Ou t pu t {Y) is produced by two factors of production: capital (K) and labor. 
Given that illegal migrants ( M ) and domestic labor (L) are perfect substitutes, 
I 
the intensive form of the constant-retuni-to-scale production function can be 
written as 
y = /(Ac) (79) 
where y 三"^；：^ and k 三 . The only difference between domestic workers 
and illegal migrants is that the latter are paid a wage below that of the former: 
w,n = I3w, 0 < /3 < 1, (80) 
where w = / ( k ) - / v / ' ( k ) = W{K) denotes the equilibrium wage rate for domestic 
workers, /? is the differential factor and Wm is the wage for the illegal workers. 
As explained by Hazari and Sgro (2003), such an exploitation occurs "because 
of the threat that the illegal workers may be reported to the authorities and 
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then deported (p. 143)." 
Following Hazari and Sgro (2003)，it is assumed that niigrants do not save 
or accumulate capital so that the resource constraint becomes 
Cit) = Y{t) - k - PwM (81) 
where C denotes domestic consumption and the dot notation represents time 
derivative.' 
We are now ready to study the optimization problem of the representative 
(loinestic household. Let c = C/L be the domestic consumption per head, then 




« = / ( « ) - ac-riK- /3(1 - a)w{K) (82) 
K(0) = Ko (83) 
0 < c < f(K) (84) 
where (82) is the per capita version of the resource constraint of (81) and a = 
L/(L + M ) . Solving the optimization problem, we derive the following first-
•'ln the real world, immigrants who move to another country illegally save and sent all their 
savings back home. Note that the results of this thesis do not change as loii马 as himiigmiits 
send their savings abroad. To see this, consider the resources constraint: K + C + Cm = 
F{K, L + A/) where Cm is the consumption of the immigrants. In the current context Cm = 
0Afw (consumption of the immigrants equals their income) and hence we arrive at constraint 
(81). Nevertheless, exactly the same result applies if we start from: K + C + Cm + Sm = 




U'{c) = /ia (85) 
A = - + n - (1 - (86) 
as well as (82) - (84). 
3.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis 
Combining (85) and (86)，we have 
V vie) ) 
whore r]{c) = -cjp^ > 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility. This together 
vvitli (82) form a two-by-two dynamical system of c and k. Note that as the 
miiiiber of illegal immigrants increases, the variable a decreases and vice versa. 
Linearization of the system yields 
(\ ( \ ( \ 
C _ 0 r (k*) + (1 - a)/3 [f"{K*) + K*f"'{K*)] c-c* 
^ « / ( - a / V ) - n — (1 一 a)Pw'{K*) 八 AC — K 、 
where the asterisk (*) denotes steady state value of a variable. We further 
assume saddle-path stability of the dynamical system so that the determi-
nant of the Jacobian matrix has to be negative, which imply / " ( « * ) + (1 -
a ) P [/ " («*) + «* / ' " ( «* )] < 0. At the steady state, c = 0 and /i 二 0, (87) and 
(82) then imply 
/ ' ( « * ) = (n + p ) - ( l - a) l3K*r{K*) (88) 
f{K*) = UK* + ac* + (1 - a)Pw{K*) (89) 
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Rcarrmigi i ig (89) and differentiating c* with respect to a , we have 
dc* dc* dc* dK* 
— I  
da da OK* da 
where the first term is the direct effect of illegal immigrat ion and the second 
term is the indirect effect which illegal immigrat ion affects domestic welfare 
through capi ta l accumulat ion. 
Ut i l i z ing (88) and differentiating k* with respect to a , we have 
dK* ^ /3K*f"{K*) Q 
da / " ( « * ) + (1 -
Note tha t the denominator is negative by saddle-path stability. As there are 
more illegal immigrants in the economy ( i.e. a decreases), the steady state 
capi ta l stock decreases. 
Ut i l i z ing (89) and part ial clifierentiating c* wi th respect to a and k* respec-
tively, wo liavo 
^ = f{K*) - riK* - ( 1 - a)l3w{K*) I I3W{K*) 
da a 
c* al3w{K*) 
= - 7 + 
ajid 
^ = f'{K*)-n + {l-a)0K*f"{K*) = 〉0 
dK* 一 a 丨 ’ 
As a result, we get 
, / p x ( PK*f"{K*) \ > (9⑴ 
da ~ a2 卞 十 VcJ V/〃(K*) + (l-a)/5K/〃'(《;^-)y < 、) 
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There are two opposing direct effects given by the first two terms on the RHS 
of (90). The first term {-c*/a^) is the exploitation effect mentioned by Hazari 
and Sgro which raises c when m increases (or a decreases) due to rent earning 
by domestic resideiits""^. The 2ii(l term (/3w(K*)/a) captures the "using-up 
capital" effect of migrants stated in Hazari and Sgro which reduces c because 
less resources are available for coiiusinption by domestic residents given the 
current production. This is proportional to the size of migrants' income which 
makes sense. Finally, there should be an intertemporal effect that is overlooked 
by Haxari and Sgro. As migrants do not save, less capital is accumulated when 
m rises and this effect is captured by the 3id term {p{dK*/da)). Note that 
the result is in contrast to Hazari and Sgro (2003) where domestic residents are 
always worse off in the sense that there is a reduction in steady state per capita 
consuiiiptioii as a decreases." 
3.2.3 Parameterizing the Model 
Since the cfToct of illegal immigration on the per capita, domestic consumption 
mid licuce welfare is ambiguous, we simulate the effect of illegal iminigration on 
domestic welfare utilizing (88) and (89) to gain further insight. We specify a 
constant-iiitortoiui)oral-elasticity-of-substitutioii (CIES) felicity function and a 
Cobb-Douglas production technology as follows: 
刚 = c i 广 1’ fiK) = AK\ 
丄一（ 7 
^Go t o (1998) also ulontifics such an efTcct which ho calls the "chcapter foreign labor" effect, 
analysis can also be studied using the graphical techniques adopted in Hazari and 
Sgro (2003). IiuloocI the analysis is identical to the Figure 2 in their paper. However, tluM'c 
is a typo in the lower part of their Figure 2. Point B there should measure ac* rather than 
c*. Recall that or is smaller than unity. As a result, c* may he larger or smaller than c**, 
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Ill the simulations, n is set to 0.025 to match the average population growth 
rate of the world, 7 is set to 0.3 so that the capital share is about 30% of the 
total output . The social discount rate (p) is set to 0.05 in order to conform to 
the real world situation that interest rate is about 5% per year. Also, cr is set 
to 2 so til at the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5. For simplicity 
A is normalized to unity. To better capture reality, we incorporate back the 
depreciation rate (5) of physical capital into the model which takes the value of 
0.1. Finally, we set the exploitation parameter (/5) to be 0.5 for the benchmark 
case, but we will perturb this parameter to test the robustness of the results. 
Fioiii the hendiniai-k siinulatioii, wo can see that per capita, domestic con-
suiiiption is very likely to rise when the lunuber of illegal migTaiits increases (see 
Figure 1). Specifically, if the "illegal migrant - domestic worker" ratio is 110 less 
than 30%, then per capita domestic coiisuniptioii rises in the presence of illegal 
migrants. Notice that from the theory discussed in the previous subsections, 
illegal migrants contribute to the domestic economy through their exploitation. 
Basically, the exploitation effect depends 011 two factors: the wage differential 
parameter (/?) mid the total miniber of niigraiits that enter the economy (m). 
The sinmUvtioii results confirm our intuition on this matter. If P increases 
(say from 0.5 to 0.8) so that the wage differential becomes narrower, then the 
exploitation 011 illegal luigrauts is smaller so that overall domestic per capita, 
coiisiiiiiptioii is likely to fall in the presence of illegal immigration (see Figure 2). 
If we reduce P instead (from 0.5 to 0.3), then per capita, consumption increases 
whenever illegal migrants appear (see Figure 3). In summary, illegal migrants 
do not necessarily reduce welfare and the outcomes depend on the extent of 
their exploitation. 
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4 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Illegal Mi-
grants 
111 this cliaptcr, wo develop a dyiiainic two-sector optimizing model with exoge-
nous wage ill order to examine the effect of illegal immigrants on the domestic 
welfare. Then, wc extend the models to the long run optimizing model which 
the wage rate is endogenous in the sense that the level of wage rate matters in 
the maximizat ion problem. We consider an economy that produces two goods, 
consumption good and investment good by two factors of production, labor and 
capital , with neoclassical production technologies. 
4.1 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: 
Illegal Migrants in Consumption Sector 
We assmiie illegal iiimiigrant is specific to the production of consumption good. 
I.e. Consnniptioi i good is produced with the help of domestic labor, illegal 
iiiiinigraiit mid capital. Noted that domestic labor and illegal iinmigraiit are 
perfectly substitutablc in this sector. 
4.1.1 Production 
The economy produces coiisuniptioii good F with domestic labor, capital and 
illegal i iniuigrant. The production function of the consumption good F is given 
below 
F = F{I<lLl + M) (91) 
where K^ denotes capital used in the consumption sector, L j denotes domestic 
labor input to tlie consumption sector, M denotes illegal immigrant. Investment 
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good G is produced by domestic labor and capital only. The production function 
of the investment good G is given below 
G = G{K' -KlL-L\) (92) 
4.1.2 The Maximization Problem 
We now introduce the objective function, 
Ju{c ' )e-P 'd t (93) 
0 
where c^ is the per capita coiisuinption (C /L ) and p represents the time discount 
rate. 
Domestic coiisuinption equals 
C = F{I<1 ’ Ll + M) - Mw,n (94) 
We know that domestic coiisuinptioii is equal to the total output minus the 
total income of illegal immigrants. Now, wo rewrite domestic consumption in 
per capita terms. 
ci = F 吹 J i + 饥）-rnl3w (95) 
where = Ll/L, k^ = I<\/L\ and m = M/L 
Domestic workers consume part of their total income and invest the rest of 
thcin l)y purchasing the investment goods in each period. Therefore, the law 
of motion for capital is 
= G { K ' — K ^ L - L l ) - S K ' (96) 
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where S is the depreciation rate of the capital. Rewriting the law of motion for 
capital ill per capita terms, we have 
= G{k' — elkl, l-£l)-{n + <5)/ci (97) 
where n = ^ and it denotes population growth rate in the economy. 
The iiiaxiinizatioii problem is to choose kl and k^ to maximize (93) 
subject to (95) ajul (97) , and given A:^(0). The wage rate in the Hamiltoiiiaii 
is exogenous in the sense that the wage rate are taken to be given. The 
Haniiltoiiiaii is 
H = ) + mM + - (A ; ) ’ 1 - • - ( n + 5)k^) 
(98) 
wlicro /i and A are the costate variables. The first-order conditions are 
C / ' ( c i ) = , i (99) 
[Fxkl + F2) /i = [G,k l + G2) A (100) 
F i ^ ^ G i X (101) 
A = A(p + n + 5 - G i ) (102) 
To gain furtlier insights, wc simplify our analysis by adopting the Cobb-
DougUus production technologies for F and G: 
= A {elkiy {el+711)'-'' (103) 
G{k' - elkl, i-el) = B - cxy (1 - (104) 
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we assinne that the utility function takes the form 
⑷ i-a - 1 
U{c) = ^ (105) 
丄 一 O" 
(100) and (101) together imply 
^ ^c+rn 二 7 _ 
1 - Q " 1 - 7 fci - e沢 、 ^ 
or - elkl = (1 _ ^ (107) 
ft 1 — 7 \ ‘ 
where k = (e^kl) / {£]. + m ) . Next (99),(101) and (105) together yield 
= (108) 
/ \ 1 一*Y 
where (I> = ( • § ) (云广 f J . Finally, from the budget constraint of the 
consiuiiption good (95), wo have 
ci = + m - (1 - a) 13m] A k " (109) 
Recalling the two clifrcrential equations, wc have 
k"- = r [1 - el] - (n + (110) 
A =入 [ p + n + 5-八K飞—1] (111) 
where r = B mul A = B 7 
(111) implies the capital labor ratio of the consumption sector is independent 
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of m at all steady state interior equilibria. 
广 (112) 
Util izing (107) and (112), we can conclude that the capital labor ratio of the 
investment is also imlependent of m at all interior equilibria. 
- 収 1 - Q 7 + n + 
T T T " ^ = L ^ T - J _ 
Therefore, the capital labor ratios of both sectors are independent of the 
amount of illegal immigrants. We examine the effect of illegal iniinigrants 
using (102), (106), (108), (109) and (110) by the simulation method. 
4.2 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: 
Illegal Migrants in Investment Sector 
We next assume illegal iniinigrants arc specific to the production of good G. 
Now, iiivcstincnt good is produced by domestic labor, illegal immigrants as well 
as capital and coiisuinptioii good is produced by domestic labor and capital only. 
The assumption of perfect substitution of domestic labor and illegal immigrant 
ill the specified see tor still hold. 
4.2.1 Production 
The economy produces coiisuiiiptioii good F with the help of domestic labor 
and capital only. The production function of the coiisuinptioii good F is given 
below 
F = F { K l L l ) (114) 
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where K^ denotes capital used in the consumption sector, L^ denotes domestic 
labor input to the corismiiption sector. 
Now, investment good G is produced by domestic labor, illegal iiimiigrants 
and capital, the production function of the investment good G is given below: 
G = - Kl, L-LI + M) (115) 
where K"^ clonotos total capital stock in the economy, L denotes total labor 
supply and M denotes illegal immigrant. 
4.2.2 The Maximization Problem 
Since the other specifications of this model is similar to the model in chapter 4.1, 
we go to the nuixiinizatioii problem directly, without repeating the details. The 
maximizat ion problem is to choose c^, ^c ^^ to maximize (93) subject 
to the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital , mid given 
Where c2 = C^/L, CI = Ll/L, kl = Kl/Ll and /c^  = K'^/L. The Hainiltoiiian 
is 
/ / = t/(c2) + 人 O - c 2 — + A(G(A;2 — £ g A；】 ,1 + - (n + 5)A;2) 
(116) 
where n and A arc the costate variables. The first order conditions of the 
maximizat ion problem become 
= /X (117) 
[ F y k l ^ F 2 ) ^ L = { G x k l + G 2 ) X (118) 
F i / i = G iA (119) 
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A = x{p + n + 6 - G i ) (120) 
Note that (118) and (119) together imply 
F2M = G2A (121) 
The Cobb-Douglas production technologies for F and G: 
= (122) 
G{k-'-kll-el+m) = B - kiy (1 — t\ + (123) 
Then (119) ami (121) together imply 
1 — a eikl ~ 1 - 7 /c2 - 恍 、 > 
or e — ilkl = ^ ^ (1 - + m ) kl (125) 
Next (117) and (119) together yield 
(c2 广 = ( 1 2 6 ) 
Recalling the budget constraint of the consuiiiptioii good,we have 
c2 = [el - (1 - a )Pm] A { k l r (127) 
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Recall ing the two (liffereiitial equations, we have 
k''= r [1-el + m] {kly - (n + (128) 
X = X(p + n + 6- (129) 
Similarly, (129) implies the capital labor ratio of the consumption sector is 
i iulcpeiulcnt of in at all steady state interior equilibria. 
紀 力 (130) 
Util iz ing (125) and (130), we have 
fe^ - 二 1 - a 7 [p + n l ^ 
(1 - 巧 + m ) 一 cv 1 - 7 A j ^ ‘ 
where — (1 一巧 + m ) is the capital labor ratio of the investment sector 
and it is iiKlcpciideut of m at all steady state interior equilibria. 
Eciuatioiis (124), (126), (127), (128) and (129) form a non-linear system and 
that complete the model. 
4.3 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Exogenous Wage: 
Illegal Migrants in both Sectors 
111 this siibsoctioii, wo consider the case that illegal iiiiniigraiits can work in 
both consiiiuptioii ami investment sector. I.e. Both consumption good F and 
investment good G can be produced by domestic labor, illegal iiiiniigrant and 
capital . Moreover, doiuostic labor and illegal iiniuigrant are perfect substitution 
in the two production sectors. 
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4.3.1 Production 
The production fimctiou of the consumption good F is given below 
F = F { K l L l + M , ) (132) 
where K^ denotes capital used in the consumption sector, L^ denotes domestic 
labor input to the coiisuinptioii sector, Mc denotes illegal immigrant employed 
ill the coiisuinption sector. 
Since illegal immigrants are no more sector specific, investment good G can 
be produced by domestic labor, capital as well as illegal immigrant. The pro-
duction function of the investment good G is given below 
G = G{K''' - K't L-Ll+M- AQ (133) 
where K^ denotes total amount of capital stock, L denotes the total domestic 
labor available, M denotes total stock of illegal immigrants in the economy. 
4.3.2 The Maximization Problem 
The luaxiniization problem is to choose c:'，ic, /Cc.and k^ to maximize (93) subject 
to the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital , and given A;^(0). 
Where c^ = C ' ^ L , kc 三 K l / L J l = L l / L , m c 三 Mc/L、m 二 M / L a n d fc^ = 
K ^ I L . The Hamiltonian becomes, 
H = U{c^) + /X F(fcc, € + rric) - c^ - lUcfiwc - (m - (134) 
+入 - kc, 1 + m - 77ic - tl) - (n + 
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/Liiind 入 are the costate variables. Differentiate the Hamil tonian with respect to 
the ic, yields the first order conditions, 
u'{c^) = n (135) 
Fi/i = GiX (136) 
Fa/x = G2A (137) 
X = X{p + n + 6 -Gi) (138) 
The Cobb-Douglas production functions for F and G: 
FCkc J l+ r r i c ) = A 妙 : 十 饥 。 ” - " (139) 
G(fc3 - fc,,, 1 + 771 - mc - 恐 = - + m - m c - (140) 
Equat ions (136) and (137) yield 
a jCl + mc) 二 7 (1 - 4 + m - rric) “41) 
- " ， - ‘ = ( 1 — + 爪—m.) ^ ^ (142) 
Then (135) and (136) together imply 
( c 3 ” =《>p-«A (143) 
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The budget constraint of the consumption good implies 
c3 = [{el + mc) - (1 - a)mP] Ak® (144) 
where k = kc/i^c + 爪c) 
Recalling the two differential equations, we have 
fc^ = r [l + m - 4 ] K^ -{n + (145) 
\ = \[p + n + 6- Kk^-^] (146) 
(146) iinjilies the capital labor ratio of the consvunptioii sector is independent 
of m at all interior equilibria. 
« = (147) 
Note that k = K ^ / { L l + Mc) which it the capital labor ratio of the con-
sinnpt iou sector. Uti l izing (142) and (147) , we have 
- fcc = 7 l - Q [ p + n ] 六 (148) 
{1- Cc + rn- rric) ~ 1 - 7 a [ A 
where {k^ - kc)/ {I - ic + rn- rric) is the capital labor ratio of the investment 
sector. (148) implies the capital labor ratio of the investiiieiit sector is also 
independent of m at all interior equilibria. 
We assume 6 proportion of m goes to the consiunptioii sector and the rest 
of them (1 — 9) works in the investment sector. These imply 
rnc = em, l-7nc= {1 - 9)m, 0 < 0 < 1 (149) 
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Equat ions (141), (143), (144) ,(146) and (146) form a non-linear system and that 
complete the model. 
4.4 Analytical Insights 
By equations (111),(129) and (146), we conclude that the variables k,k^ and 
k arc iiidepeiulont of m at the steady state interior equilibria' . Therefore, 
if more labor (iiiclvidiiig domestic labor and illegal immigrants) are employed 
ill the consuiuptioii sector, the capital used in the consumption sector rises. 
At the now steady state, the capital input of the consuiuptioii sector increases 
proportionally to the raise in labor input and the capital labor ratio of the 
consumption sector goes back to the original level. 
Uiulcr the property of the lioinogenous of degree one of the production fuiic-
tion and the autononious capital labor ratio in the consumption sector, the 
cluuigc in the steady state output of the consumption good must be propor-
tional to the change in labor input. The steady state per capita, consumption 
of the model in chapter 4.1 is 
ci = [4 + m - (1 - q) /3m] Ak" 
Difierontiating c^ with respect to m, we have 
(150) 
am [ dm 
It is dear that the presence of illegal immigrants is beneficial to the domestic 
workers if ami only if the first term in the square bracket is larger than the term 
7 Nolo that K, k l and Knre t he capital labor ratio in the consumption sector of the three 
models, respectively. 
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(1 — a)/3. The presence of illegal immigrants has two effects on the steady state 
per capi ta coiisuniptiou. Since there are more labors in the economy, the optimal 
labor share of the coiisuinptioii sector changes and hence the output of the 
consumpt ion sector cliaiigcs. Moreover, more consumption goods are consumed 
l)y the illegal iniinigrants clue to the increase in stock of illegal immigrants. Note 
that the domestic residents are more likely to gain from illegal immigration with 
a lower (lifferoiitial factor {(5). This confirms to our intuition that the domestic 
residents gain form exploiting the illegal iinniigrants and a lower 3 implies a, 
larger cxploitalioi i^. No matter illegal iniinigrants are sector specific or work in 
bo th sectors, the models share the same properties which the capital labor ratios 
of the two sectors are iiidepeiideiit of m at all steady state interior equilibria. 
Therefore, the analysis above is applicable to the models in chapter 4.2 and 4.3. 
4.5 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: 
Illegal Migrants in Consumption Sector 
W o extend the model in chapter 4.1 to a two sector optimizing model with 
eiKlogcnoiis wage which illegal iiiiinigrants are sector-specific to the consumption 
sector. Recall ing the maximizat ion problem in 4.1，we consider the wage rate 
ill the I la i i i i l tonian matters in the maximizat ion problem. The maximization 
problem is to choose c ^ J l , k^ iMid k^ to maximize (93) subject to (95) and (97) 
, a n d given k^{0). 
H = U{c') + ^i{F{elklel + 772) - c^ - ml3F2{elklel + m) ) 
+XiGik' — t\k\, H ; ) 一 (n + 5)/ci) (151) 
^The siinulfttions also confirm the intuition. Sec Table 5 and Table 6. 
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where /i and A arc the costate variables. The first-order conditions are 
= (152) 
{Fikl + F2) “ 一 {F^.kl + 如 = ( G i / c ； + G^) A (153) 
F i / i -m /3F2 i ^ = GiA (154) 
A = A(p + n + 5 — G i ) (155) 
(153) and (154) together imply 
” 二 1 = ’ (156) 
F2 - mpF22 G2 
Note that m^F2\ is positive and mfiF22 is negative. Now, the allocation of clo-
luostic labor ami capital between the sectors also depends on m. The rent-wage 
ratio ill the coiisiiniptioii sector bocomes larger when there is illegal innnigratioii. 
The intuition is straiglitforvvarcl. When illegal migrants enter the coiisuinption 
sector, cliiniiiishiiig returns and factor complementarity lower the real wage but 
raise the rental rate in the sector. Finally, we have the law of motion for capital 
as well as the rcsoiircc constraint for consumption goods, 
k = G{k' - elk^l — Cl) - (n + 6)k\ (157) 
= F { e X J l + m ) - m l 3 F 2 (158) 
Coiuljiiiiiig (156), (155) and (157) and applying the steady state conditions 
^ = 0 and A = 0, wc are in principle able to solve for the steady state values of 
the variables , k l , and k^. However, given the non-linearity of the system, we 
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are unab le to obta in analytical solutions. In turn, we adopt the C IES util ity 
funct ion aiul the Cobl)-Douglas product ion functions 
F队,ic + m) = A ( ⑷ " ( 4 + 
G{k - ickc, 1 - 4 ) = B{k - CckcVil — 4 ) 1 ” . 
and s imulate the steady-state cffects of illegal ininiigration on these variables. 
4.6 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: 
Illegal Migrants in Investment Sector 
W e extend the model in chapter 4.2 to a two-sector opt imiz ing model with en-
dogenous wage. We recall the i i iaxiniization problem, the representative house-
hold luaximize (93) by choosing c^, , fc^ and fc^subject to the budget constraint 
and the law of mot ion for capital , ami given /c^(0). 
H = U{c') + ^{F{elklel) - - ml3G2{k^ - f X , 1 - ^c 
+A(G(fc2 一 elkl 1 — C + m ) - (n + 6)k'') (159) 
where fx and 入 are the costate variables. The first order conditions of the 
max i iu i za t iou problem beconic 
C / V ) = (160) 
{Fikt + 厂2) ” + (G2I/cc + G 2 2 ) m / 3入 = { G i k l + G2)入 （161) 
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F … = (162) 
X = X{p + n + 6 + m P G 2 i - G i ) (163) 
(161) and (162) together yield 
A = G,-mpGx2 (164) 
F2 G2 - m冷G22 
Simi lar to the previous model , the al location of domestic labor and capital be-
tween the sectors also deponcls on m . The rent-wage ratio becomes larger when 
there is illegal i i n in igmt ion due to d imin ish ing returns and factor complemen-
tarity. Fil ial ly, wc have the law of mot ion for capital as well as the resource 
constra int for consumpt ion goods, 
k'^ = - elkl i-el+rn)-{n + 5)k'' (165) 
c'' = F { e l k l e l ) - m ( 3 G 2 - (166) 
W c adop t the C I E S ut i l i ty funct ion and the Cobb-Douglas production func-
t ions (122)ai id (123) and s imulate the steady-state effects of illegal immigrat ion. 
4.7 Two-sector Optimizing Model with Endogenous Wage: 
Illegal Migrants in both Sectors 
W e cxtciicl the model in chapter 4.3 to a. two-sector opt imiz ing model with 
ci idogci ious wage. The inax imizat ion problem is to choose c^, k^ and k^ to 
max im i ze (93) subject to the budget constraint and the law of mot ion for capital 
53 
, a n d given A;''(0). 
H = + n F{kc, C + mc) - c^ - mdSwc - (m — mc)pwi 
+A — kc, 1 + m — nic - 巧） - ( n + 5)/c3] (167) 
where k 三 八 三 Ll/L, m^ 三 Mc/L, m = M/L,iuc = F2((’c’ 巧 + "^c) 
and wi = - kc, 1 + m - nic - 巧 ) D i f f e r e n t i a t e the Haiiiiltoniaii with 
respect to the 人i!，aiulfc:，yields the first order conditions, 
t / ( c : ” = /i (168) 
( A — mc阳22、H + (m - m,0/3^22A = G2X (169) 
(Fi - mc0F-2i)^t + (m - m(:)卢G21A = GiA (170) 
A = A (p + 71 + (5 + (m - rnc)l3G2i - G i ) (171) 
(109) and (170) together imply, 
- mc0F2i = Gi - (m - mc)(3G2i (172) 
F2 - mc(3F22 G2 - (m - mc)阳22 
Finally, wc have the law of iiiotioii for capital and the resource constraint 
for consmnptioii goods, 
= - kc, I + r n - m 。 -《）- ( n + (173) 
c3 = F{kc, ei + nic) - maPF2 — (m - mc ) ^G2- (174) 
A' 
Wc assume 9 proportion of m goes to the consumption sector and the rest 
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of them (1 - 6) works in the investment sector. These implies 
mc = Ovi, l - m c = ( l - 0 ) m ’ 0 < 0 < 1 (175) 
Adop t i ng the Cobl)-Do\iglas product ion functions (139) and (140) and set-
t ing k = 0 and A = 0, wo can simulate the effect of illegal immigrat ion on the 
variables. 
4.8 Parameterizing the Models 
Following the previous chapter, in the simulations, n is set to 0.025, 13 is set to 
0.8, a is set to 0.3 mi(l S is set to 0.1. The t ime discount rate (p) is set to 
0.05. cr is sot to 2 so that the iiitcrteinporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5. 
For simplicity A and B arc normalized to unity. For the two-sector model in 
chapter 4.3 and chaplcr 4.7, wo consider 6 takes the values of 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 
to examine the welfare effect of illegal immigrat ion when they can choose to 
work ill bo th of the scctors. In the simulations’ we consider three cases so as 
to uiulerstaiul the role played by relative factor intensity: (1) investment sector 
is capital intensive (7 = 0.6), (2)investiiiciit sector is labor intensive (7 = 0.1) 
and (3) identical technology in the two sectors (7 = 0： = 0.3). Finally, for the 
range of m , we start from zero and up to the 20% level. 
4.9 Simulation Results 
4.9.1 Simulation Results: Two-sector Optimizing Model with Ex-
ogenous Wage 
The s imulat ion results under the parameterizat ion are reported in Table 5 and 
Table 6. In all the cases, the steady state per capita consumption increases as 
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there is illegal immigrant working in the economy. Note that under the paranie-
tcrizatioii, the welfare effect of illegal iminigration is independent of the relative 
factor intensity. The capital labor ratio of the investment sector is indepen-
dent of m so that the no-saving behavior of illegal migrants does not generate 
a negative intertemporal effect on per capita consumption. In conclusion, ille-
gal i ininigraiits contribute to the domestic economy through their exploitation. 
Moreover, there is the consmupt ion or using-up capital effect of migrants which 
reduces c. Under reasonable parameterization，the using-up capital effect is 
(loininatod by the exploitation effect even we consider the exploitation is only 
5% of the normal wage rate. 
One special result of the sinmlatioiis is that the effect of illegal iminigration 
on the per capita, consuniptioii of the domestic residents is indifferent between 
the models. Moreover, corner solution is possible if the amount of illegal iin-
migrants is large. 
Proposit ion 1 The effect of the presence of illegal iminigraiit in con-
sumpt ion sector, investment sector or both sectors on the long run per capita 
consunipt ioi i are identical at all interior equilibria. 
By equations (102),(120) ami (138), we can pin down the capital labor ratio 
of tlio consuniptioi i sector in the three models and this implies k = k^ = k. 
Next, using equations (107)，(110),(125),(128),(142) aiid(145), we can prove 
that Cl + 7n = = 4，+ rric. Using the above relation and all the first order 
condit ions, we can easily prove that k^ — k"^  = /c^  by equations (110),(128) 
and (145), c^ = c ' = c^ by equations (109),(127) and (144) and the shadow 
price of the consumpt ion sector (A) arc identical by (108),(126) and (143). The 
‘ intu i t ion is that at all interior equilibria, the wage rate in both sectors are 
identical since all the first order conditions must be satisfied. Therefore, total 
income received by illegal i inmigrants is the same in the three models given 
the amoun t of illegal immigrants. Since production are proportional to the 
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labor input and 4 + ^ = ^c = ^c + "^c, the total output of the consumption 
sector is identical in the three models. As a result, the effect of the presence 
of illegal immigrant in coiisuniptioii sector, investment sector or both sectors 
on the welfare of the domestic residents are identical at all interior equilibria 
under the two-sector opt imizing nioclol with exogenous wage model. Note that 
at conior solutions, proposition 1 does not hold because equation (107) or (125) 
is not satisfied. 
Proposition 2 Corner solution may exist and it depends on the amount 
of illegal migrants and the production structure of the economy. 
Wo present two examples in Table 7. In Table 7a, we assume illegal iinini-
grants are sector specific to consumption sector. Corner solution exists when 
"illegal migrmits-cloinestic worker" ratio m is equal to or higher than 0.1 with 
cv = 0.95 and 7 = 0.1 which all the domestic residents are working in the 
investment sector with a higher normal wage rate. 
In Tabic 7b, we assume illegal immigrant is specific to investment sector. 
Corner solution exists when rn is larger than or equal to 0.15 with a = 0.3 and 
7 = 0.8. The presence of illegal imii i ignmts will drive down the wage rate of 
the investment sector and cloiiiestic labors will shift from the investment sector 
to the coiisuiiiption scctor. If the amount of illegal immigrant is large, the wage 
rate in the two sectors cannot restore to the cquilibriuiii situation, then corner 
solution exists. For the same reason we have already discussed in chapter 2.6， 
proposit ion 2 still hold even illegal migrants can work in either sector. 
4.9.2 Simulation Results: Two-sector Optimizing Model with En-
dogenous Wage 
Table 8 shows the benchmark case which /3 equals to 0.5 for the two-sector 
model with eu(iogcnous wage. One important conclusion that we see is that 
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the presence of illegal niigraiits always lead to an increase in the steady state per 
capita domestic consumption. In Table 9, we increase the differential factor 
13 to 0.8 ill order to reduce the positive exploitation effect. Unlike the one-
sector model, even with this iniiiiinal level of exploitation, per capita domestic 
coiisuinption always rises with illegal migrants. Nevertheless, the simulations 
confirm our intuit ion that the steady state per capita consumption is lower with 
a larger (3 and vise versa since the exploitation to illegal immigrants are larger 
with a smaller /5. 
W h e n illegal i i imiigrants are sector specific to the consumption sector, ille-
gal i imnigrants contribute to the domestic economy through their exploitation 
which is the exploitation effect iiieiitioiied by Hazari and Sgro. Secondly, there is 
the consuii iption or usiiig-np capital effect of migrants stated in Hazari and Sgro 
which reduces c. Finally, the no-saving behavior of illegal migrants generates a 
negative intertemporal eflbct on per capita consumption. However, because the 
nmlti-scctor setup allows domestic factors of production to move freely across 
sectors, the negative iisiiig-iip capital effect in the one-sector model is reduced as 
the tratleofF between coiisuinption and investment goods is no longer one to one. 
In addi t ion, we note that (155) remains unchanged as in the initial case with 
zeroni igrai i ts . As a result, we do not have a negative intertemporal effect when 
there are more illegal iininigraiits if they arc sector specific to the consiiinptioii 
sector. In suniiuary, within this two-sector framework, all the negative effects 
of illegal migrants on per capita domestic coiisuinption are either diminished or 
el iminated while the positive effects arc unchanged, the favorable outcomes on 
per capi ta consuinptioii in the simulation can be easily understood. It seems 
that our findings cast doubt oil the welfare conclusion of Hazari and Sgro (2003). 
Recall ill their paper that per capita consumption is unlikely to fall when mi-
grants and domestic workers arc imperfect substitutes in production. But this 
is not really the case. In our multi-sector setting, although domestic workers 
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and illegal migrants arc porfect substitutes in production in the consumption 
sector, tlioy are imperfect substitutes in terms of overall production as illegal 
migrants cannot bo used to produce investinciit goods'」. Thus, our analysis here 
provides an ccoiioniic interpretation of the imperfect substitutability studied in 
Hazari and Sgro based on sectoral resources allocation. 
We next examine the robustness of our simulated findings by considering 
some alternative specifications of the benchmark case. If illegal immigrants 
are not specific only to the consuniption sector, then the presence of illegal 
niigraiits aficct llic intertemporal dccisioii of the agents so that m. enters into 
equations (103) ami (171). As a result, the negative intertemporal effect on 
per capita cousuniptioii is recovered. In addition, such an intertemporal effect 
bccoines stronger as more illegal migrants enter into the investment sector. All 
these imply that the favorable outcomes on per capita domestic consumption 
urc climiii ishal (or even reversed) which is confirmed by our sinmlation. As 
a matter of fact, except in one very extreme case, we are unable to obtain 
adverse welfare efFects of illegal immigration.") Only when we reduce the 
positive exploitation clFect on per capita domestic consumption by raising to 
0.95 and increase the negative intertemporal effect by having at least 75% of 
illegal niigrajits work in the capital intensive investment sector, then per capita 
domestic consumption falls below its initial iio-uiigrant level when the "illegal 
inigrants-clomcstic worker" ratio (m) begins to rise (see Table 10). 
9 Even when we consider tlie situation where illegal migrants can work in either sector, the 
inflows of niigraiits into the sectors are still exogenously chosen. Strictly speaking, illegal 
migrants are not frco to clioosc to work between the two sectors. As a result, the logic of 
iniptM-fect s\il)stitutal)ility of labor discussed in Hazari and Sgro (2003) continues to work in 
these cases. 
" 'Even when we consider a 20% wage differential between domestic workers and illegal 
migrants (/3 = 0.8), por capita consumption (Iocs not fall. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
III this thesis, wc have examined the equilibrium effects of illegal immigration 
oil the (loniestic welfare in a dynamic framework. Throughout this thesis, we 
consider illegal i ininigrant and domestic labor are perfect substitutes. For the 
oiie-scctor model under noii-optiinizing structure and optimizing structure with 
exogenous wage, illegal immigrat ion necessarily rises the long run per capita 
consumpt ion. We also re-cxmiiiiie the Hazari-Sgro model with illegal migrants 
which is a one-sector optimizing model with endogenous wage. In contrast to 
their negative conclusion, wo obtain ambiguous welfare prediction which is due 
to the prescuco of three effects at work: a positive exploitation effect, a negative 
iisiiig-up-capital effect and a negative intertemporal effect. Under reasonable 
parainotcrization, we are able to provide nuiiierical examples that per capita 
(loinostic coiisuniptioii rises in the presence of illegal niigration. 
We also oxtciicl the one-sector models to the two-sector economy with con-
sumpt ion and invcstinoiit sector to examine the steady state domestic welfare 
effect of illegal imiii igration. We conclude that illegal immigration basically 
benefits the domestic residents under reasonable parameterization. For the 
iioii-optiiiii'/iug model ami opt imiz ing model with exogenous wage, the welfare 
efFoct of illegal immigrat ion is independent of the sectoral allocation of illegal 
migrants. For the two sector optimizing model with endogenous wage, al-
though the throe contrasting effects are still at work as in the one-sector case, 
the multi-sector setup loaves room for iis to adjust the magnitude of the nega-
tive effects. Following our bench mark parameterization used in the one-sector 
case (The Hazari-Sgro Model with Illegal Migrants) , we are unable to find a 
negative effcct of illegal immigrat iou on domestic per capita, consumption or 
welfare. However, when we move to very extreme parameterization such as 
there is only a 5% wage dilfcreutial between domestic workers and illegal mi-
60 
grants and at least 75% of the migrants work in the capital-intensive investment 
sector, then a rise in the "illegal migrants-domestic worker" ratio can lead to 
a fall ill the per capita, domestic consumption. In summary, we conclude that 
the welfare criterion due to labor substitiitability proposed in Hazari and Sgro 
(2003) can have a new interpretation based on sectoral resources allocation for 
a imilti-sector economy. 
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64 
% of migrant Table l'- (s=0.02)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 0.28455 0.44682 0.55238 
0.025 0.28481 0.44908 0.55586 
0.05 0.28513 0.45139 0.55938 
0.075 0.28552 0.45375 0.56294 
100% 0.1 0.28596 0.45615 0.56655 
0.125 0.28645 0.4586 0.57019 
0.15 0.287 0.46108 0.57387 
0.175 0.28759 0.4636 0.57759 
0.2 0.28822 0.46615 0.58133 
0 0.28455 0.44682 0.55238 
0.025 0.23613 0.44908 0.55586 
0.05 0.29042 0.45139 0.55938 
0.075 0.32732 0.45375 0.56294 
75% 0.1 0.35648 0.4813 0.56655 
0.125 0.38061 0.51547 0.59558 
0.15 0.40179 0.54537 0.63065 
0.175 0.42019 0.57219 0.66217 
0.2 0.43702 0.59664 0.69101 
0 0.28455 0.44682 0.55238 
0.025 0.29088 0.44908 0.55586 
0.05 0.35772 0.47933 0.55938 
0.075 0.40365 0.54187 0.62448 
50% 0.1 0.43951 0.5913 0.68186 
0.125 0.4696 0.63293 0.73024 
0.15 0.49574 0.66919 0.77256 
0.175 0.51854 0.70163 0.81046 
0.2 0.53956 0.73113 0.84498 
The bold-faced numbers represent the steady state per capita consumption at corner solutions. 
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% of m i g r a n t T a b l e 1 (s=0.02) “ 
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 0.28455 0.44682 0.55238 
0.025 0.32868 0.43897 0.55586 
0.05 0.40444 0.54078 0.62252 
0.075 0.45649 0.61106 0.70359 
25% 0.1 0.49737 0.66646 0.76761 
0.125 0.53152 0.71294 0.8214 
0.15 0.56113 0.7534 0.86827 
0.175 0.58760 0.78946 0.91009 
0.2 0.61112 0.82215 0.94804 
0 0.28455 0.44682 0.55238 
0.025 0.35853 0.47822 0.55586 
0.05 0.4414 0.58902 0.67758 
0.075 0.4985 0.66521 0.76523 
0% 0.1 0.54349 0.72517 0.8342 
0.125 0.58107 0.77537 0.89196 
0.15 0.61372 0.81897 0.94211 
0.175 0.64279 0.85773 0.9867 
0.2 0.66904 0.89279 1.027 
66 
% of migrant Table 2 (s=0.07)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 0.68134 0.72538 0.79379 
0.025 0.68242 0.72905 0.79859 
0.05 0.68364 0.7328 0.80347 
0.075 0.68498 0.73662 0.80842 
100% 0.1 0.68644 0.74052 0.81344 
0.125 0.68801 0.74449 0.81852 
0.15 0.68968 0.74852 0.82365 
0.175 0.69146 0.75261 0.82884 
0.2 0.69332 0.75676 0.83408 
0 0.68134 0.72538 0.79379 
0.025 0.68242 0.72905 0.79859 
0.05 0.68364 0.7328 0.80347 
0.075 0.68498 0.73662 0.80842 
75% 0.1 0.68644 0.74052 0.81344 
0.125 0.68801 0.74449 0.81852 
0.15 0.68968 0.74852 0.82365 
0.175 0.69146 0.75261 0.82884 
0.2 0.71627 0.75676 0.83408 
0 0.68134 0.72538 0.79379 
0.025 0.68242 0.72905 0.79859 
0.05 0.68364 0.7328 0.80347 
0.075 0.68498 0.73662 0.80842 
50% 0.1 0.71815 0.74052 0.81344 
0.125 0.7675 0.74449 0.81852 
0.15 0.81029 0.74963 0.82365 
0.175 0.84831 0.78607 0.82884 
0.2 0.88268 0.8192 0.84389 
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% of migrant Table 2 (s=0.07)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 0.68134 0.72538 0.79379 
0.025 0.68242 0.72905 0.79859 
0.05 0.68364 0.7328 0.80842 
0.075 0.74505 0.73662 0.80842 
25% 0.1 0.81207 0.74616 0.81344 
0.125 0.86791 0.79828 0.82019 
0.15 0.91644 0.84364 0.867 
0.175 0.95955 0.88407 0.90877 
0.2 0.99859 0.92076 0.9467 
0 0.68134 0.72538 0.79379 
0.025 0.68242 0.72905 0.79859 
0.05 0.71993 0.7328 0.80347 
0.075 0.81305 0.74457 0.80842 
0% 0.1 0.88634 0.81167 0.83289 
0.125 0.9477 0.86788 0.89056 
0.15 1.001 0.91667 0.94063 
0.175 1.0485 0.9601 0.98515 
0.2 1.0912 0.99931 1.0254 
68 
% of migrant Table 3 (s=0.15)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.0832 0.91908 0.93257 
0.025 1.0859 0.92373 0.93783 
0.05 1.0888 0.92848 0.94321 
0.075 1.0919 0.93333 0.94867 
100% 0.1 1.0952 0.93827 0.95423 
0.125 1.0985 0.9433 0.95986 
0.15 1.1021 0.9484 0.96558 
0.175 1.1057 0.95359 0.97137 
0.2 1.1095 0.95884 0.97723 
0 1.0832 0.91908 0.93257 
0.025 1.0859 0.92373 0.93783 
0.05 1.0888 0.92848 0.94321 
0.075 1.0919 0.93333 0.94867 
75% 0.1 1.0952 0.93827 0.95423 
0.125 1.0985 0.9433 0.95986 
0.15 1.1021 0.9484 0.96558 
0.175 1.1057 0.95359 0.97137 
0.2 1.1095 0.95884 0.97723 
0 1.0832 0.91908 0.93257 
0.025 1.0859 0.92373 0.93783 
0.05 1.0888 0.92848 0.94321 
0.075 1.0919 0.93333 0.94867 
50% 0.1 1.0952 0.93827 0.95423 
0.125 1.0985 0.9433 0.95986 
0.15 1.1021 0.9484 0.96558 
0.175 1.1057 0.95359 0.97137 
0.2 1.1106 0.95884 0.97723 
69 
% of migrant Table 3 (s=0.15)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m ^ ^ 0.1 
0 1.0832 0.91908 0.93257 
0.025 1.0859 0.92373 0.93783 
0.05 1.0888 0.92848 0.94321 
0.075 1.0919 0.93333 0.94867 
25% 0.1 1.0181 0.93827 0.95423 
0.125 1.0886 0.9433 0.95986 
0.15 1.1499 0.9484 0.96558 
0.175 1.2043 0.89884 0.97137 
0.2 1.2535 0.9362 0.97723 
0 1.0832 0.91908 0.93257 
0.025 1.0859 0.92373 0.93783 
0.05 1.0888 0.92848 0.94321 
0.075 1.0919 0.93333 0.94867 
0% 0.1 1.11 0.93827 0.95423 
0.125 1.1868 0.9433 0.95986 
0.15 1.2536 0.9484 0.96558 
0.175 1.3129 0.9754 0.97137 
0.2 1.3665 1.0153 0.97723 
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Table 4 a : comer solution。 
illegal migrant in consumption sector 
alpha beta gamma s 
0.95 0.8 0.1 0.15 
m c' {、, k] k、 
0 4.1509 0.76056 0.1178 4.9129 
0.05 4.3145 0.79707 0.11679 5.1443 
0.1 4.4786 0.83358 0.11588 5.3757 
0.15 4.6431 0.87008 0.11505 5.6071 
0.2 4.8081 0.90659 0.1143 5.8386 
0.25 4.9733 0.9431 0.11362 6.0701 
0.3 5.1389 0.97961 0.113 6.3016 
0.35 5.2486 1 0.11267 6.4309 
0.4 5.2837 1 0.11267 6.4309 
Table 4 b : corner solution 
illegal migrant in investment sector 
alpha beta gamma s 
0.3 0.8 0.6 0.15 
m kl 
0 1.0832 0.9084 1.7977 2.2094 
0.025 1.0859 0.93239 1.748 2.1965 
0.05 1.0888 0.95638 1.7013 2.1845 
0.075 1.0919 0.98037 1.6572 2.1735 
0.1 1.0181 1 1.6969 2.2623 
0.125 1.0886 1 2.0933 2.7804 
0.15 1.1499 1 2.4784 3.2796 
0.175 1.2043 1 2.8519 3.7598 
0.2 1.2535 1 3.2125 4.2193 
13 where C； - L \ I L and. k ] - K \ I L , 
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% of migrant Table 5 (beta=Q.8)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4363 0.997 0.96603 
0.05 1.4477 1.0041 0.9726 
0.075 1.4591 1.0112 0.97916 
100% 0.1 1.4705 1.0183 0.98573 
0.125 1.4819 1.0254 0.9923 
0.15 1.4933 1.0325 0.99887 
0.175 1.5047 1.0397 1.0054 
0.2 1.5161 1.0468 1.012 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4363 0.997 0.96603 
0.05 1.4477 1.0041 0.9726 
0.075 1.4591 1.0112 0.97916 
75% 0.1 1.4705 1.0183 0.98573 
0.125 1.4819 1.0254 0.9923 
0.15 1.4933 1.0325 0.99887 
0.175 1.5047 1.0397 1.0054 
0.2 1.5161 1.0468 1.012 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4363 0.997 0.96603 
0.05 1.4477 1.0041 0.9726 
0.075 1.4591 1.0112 0.97916 
50% 0.1 1.4705 1.0183 0.98573 
0.125 1.4819 1.0254 0.9923 
0.15 1.4933 1.0325 0.99887 
0.175 1.5047 1.0397 1.0054 
0.2 1.5161 1.0468 1.012 
72 
% of migrant Table 5 (beta=0.8)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4363 0.997 0.96603 
0.05 1.4477 1.0041 0.9726 
0.075 1.4591 1.0112 0.97916 
25% 0.1 1.4705 1.0183 0.98573 
0.125 1.4819 1.0254 0.9923 
0.15 1.4933 1.0325 0.99887 
0.175 1.5047 1.0397 1.0054 
0.2 1.5161 1.0468 1.012 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4363 0.997 0.96603 
0.05 1.4477 1.0041 0.9726 
0.075 1.4591 1.0112 0.97916 
0% 0.1 1.4705 1.0183 0.98573 
0.125 1.4819 1.0254 0.9923 
0.15 1.4933 1.0325 0.99887 
0.175 1.5047 1.0397 1.0054 
0.2 1.5161 1.0468 1.012 
73 
% of migrant Table 6 (beta=0.95)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m ^ ^ 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4318 0.99369 0.96276 
0.05 1.4386 0.99749 0.96606 
0.075 1.4455 1.0013 0.96937 
100% 0.1 1.4524 1.0051 0.97267 
0.125 1.4592 1.0089 0.97597 
0.15 1.4661 1.0127 0.97928 
0.175 1.4729 1.0165 0.98258 
0.2 1.4798 1.0203 0.98588 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4318 0.99369 0.96276 
0.05 1.4386 0.99749 0.96606 
0.075 1.4455 1.0013 0.96937 
75% 0.1 1.4524 1.0051 0.97267 
0.125 1.4592 1.0089 0.97597 
0.15 1.4661 1.0127 0.97928 
0.175 1.4729 1.0165 0.98258 
0.2 1.4798 1.0203 0.98588 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4318 0.99369 0.96276 
0.05 1.4386 0.99749 0.96606 
0.075 1.4455 1.0013 0.96937 
50% 0.1 1.4524 1.0051 0.97267 
0.125 1.4592 1.0089 0.97597 
0.15 1.4661 1.0127 0.97928 
0.175 1.4729 1.0165 0.98258 
0.2 1.4798 1.0203 0.98588 
74 
% of migrant Table 6 (beta=0.95)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m ^ 03 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4318 0.99369 0.96276 
0.05 1.4386 0.99749 0.96606 
0.075 1.4455 1.0013 0.96937 
25% 0.1 1.4524 1.0051 0.97267 
0.125 1.4592 1.0089 0.97597 
0.15 1.4661 1.0127 0.97928 
0.175 1.4729 1.0165 0.98258 
0.2 1.4798 1.0203 0.98588 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4318 0.99369 0.96276 
0.05 1.4386 0.99749 0.96606 
0.075 1.4455 1.0013 0.96937 
0% 0.1 1.4524 1.0051 0.97267 
0.125 1.4592 1.0089 0.97597 
0.15 1.4661 1.0127 0.97928 
0.175 1.4729 1.0165 0.98258 
0.2 1.4798 1.0203 0.98588 
75 
Table 7 a: corner solution" 
illegal migrant in consumption sector 
alpha beta gamma 
0.95 0.8 0.1 
m c ' k\ 
0 5.1753 0.92935 0.53698 6.9866 
0.025 5.2314 0.95258 0.53698 7.1612 
0.05 5.2875 0.97582 0.53698 7.3359 
0.075 5.3436 0.99905 0.53698 7.5106 
0.1 5.4197 1 0.53698 7.5177 
0.125 5.4805 1 0.53698 7.5177 
0.15 5.5307 1 0.53698 7.5178 
0.175 5.5735 1 0.53698 7.5178 
0.2 5.6109 1 0.53698 7.5178 
Table 7 b: corner solution 
illegal migrant in investment sector 
alpha beta gamma 
0.3 0.8 0.8 
m e- G? kl 
0 4.376 0.875 213.91 436.72 
0.025 4.4154 0.89688 213.91 447.64 
0.05 4.4547 0.91875 213.91 458.56 
0.075 4.4941 0.94063 213.91 469.48 
0.1 4.5335 0.9625 213.91 480.4 
0.125 4.5729 0.98438 213.91 491.32 
0.15 4.5878 1 214.97 491.01 
0.175 4.6028 1 228.76 501.44 
0.2 4.5882 1 238.46 503.63 
where C； - L]IL and. k]三 K、/L. 
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% of migrant Table 8 (beta=0.5)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4428 1.0023 0.97148 
0.05 1.4607 1.0148 0.98357 
0.075 1.4788 1.0273 0.9957 
100% 0.1 1.4968 1.0399 1.0079 
0.125 1.515 丨.0525 1.0201 
0.15 1.5332 1.0651 1.0324 
0.175 1.5515 1.0778 1.0447 
0.2 1.5699 1.0906 1.0571 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4421 1.0023 0.97166 
0.05 1.4594 1.0147 0.98389 
0.075 1.4767 1.0272 0.99615 
75% 0.1 1.4941 1.0397 1.0084 
0.125 1.5115 1.0523 1.0208 
0.15 1.529 1.0648 1.0331 
0.175 1.5466 1.0774 1.0455 
0.2 1.5642 1.0901 1.0579 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4415 1.0023 0.97183 
0.05 1.4581 1.0147 0.98423 
0.075 1.4749 1.0272 0.99665 
50% 0.1 1.4918 1.0397 1.0091 
0.125 1.5087 1.0523 1.0215 
0.15 1.5257 1.0648 1.034 
0.175 1.5428 1.0774 1.0465 
0.2 1.5599 1.09 1.059 
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% of migrant Table 8 (beta=Q.5)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4409 1.0023 0.97202 
0.05 1.457 1.0148 0.9846 
0.075 1.4733 1.0273 0.99719 
25% 0.1 1.4898 1.0399 1.0098 
0.125 1.5064 1.0525 1.0224 
0.15 1.5231 1.0651 1.0351 
0.175 1.5399 1.0777 1.0477 
0.2 1.5567 1.0904 1.0603 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4403 1.0023 0.97221 
0.05 1.456 1.0149 0.98498 
0.075 1.472 1.0275 0.99778 
0% 0.1 1.4882 1.0401 1.0106 
0.125 1.5045 1.0528 1.0234 
0.15 1.521 1.0655 1.0362 
0.175 1.5376 1.0783 1.049 


















































































































































































































% of migrant Table 9 (beta=0.8)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4292 0.99493 0.96517 
0.05 1.4339 1.0001 0.97093 
0.075 1.439 1.0054 0.97673 
25% 0.1 1.4445 1.0108 0.98255 
0.125 1.4501 1.0162 0.98838 
0.15 1.456 1.0216 0.9942 
0.175 1.462 1.027 1 
0.2 1.4681 1.0324 1.0058 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4283 0.99498 0.96548 
0.05 1.4325 1.0003 0.97156 
0.075 1.4372 1.0058 0.97768 
0% 0.1 1.4424 1.0113 0.98379 
0.125 1.4478 1.0168 0.98987 
0.15 1.4534 1.0222 0.99587 
0.175 1.4592 1.0275 1.0018 
0.2 1.4649 1.0326 1.0075 
80 
% of m i g r a n t T a b l e 10 (beta=0.95) — 
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4269 0.99124 0.96077 
0.05 1.4291 0.99281 0.96229 
0.075 1.4317 0.99458 0.96401 
100% 0.1 1.4345 0.99653 0.9659 
0.125 1.4375 0.99865 0.96796 
0.15 1.4408 1.0009 0.97017 
0.175 1.4443 1.0033 0.97252 
0.2 1.4479 1.0059 0.975 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4256 0.9912 0.96108 
0.05 1.4265 0.99267 0.96282 
0.075 1.4277 0.99428 0.96469 
75% 0.1 1.4291 0.99601 0.96666 
0.125 1.4307 0.99787 0.96874 
0.15 1.4325 0.99983 0.97091 
0.175 1.4345 1.0019 0.97318 
0.2 1.4367 1.0041 0.97553 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4244 0.99121 0.9614 
0.05 1.4243 0.99268 0.96343 
0.075 1.4245 0.99428 0.96553 
50% 0.1 1.425 0.99598 0.96769 
0.125 1.4258 0.99777 0.9699 
0.15 1.4268 0.99962 0.97215 
0.175 1.428 1.0015 0.97444 
0.2 1.4293 1.0035 0.97676 
81 
% of migrant Table 10 (beta=0.95)  
in consumption gamma 
sector m 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4233 0.99125 0.96175 
0.05 1.4224 0.99282 0.96411 
0.075 1.422 0.99452 0.96651 
25% 0.1 1.422 0.9963 0.96893 
0.125 1.4223 0.99811 0.97135 
0.15 1.4228 0.99989 0.97373 
0.175 1.4234 1.0016 0.97606 
0.2 1.4241 1.0032 0.97828 
0 1.4249 0.98989 0.95946 
0.025 1.4223 0.99133 0.96212 
0.05 1.4209 0.99307 0.96486 
0.075 1.4201 0.99496 0.96763 
0% 0.1 1.4198 0.99686 0.97036 
0.125 1.4198 0.99867 0.973 
0.15 1.42 1.0003 0.97546 
0.175 1.4202 1.0016 0.97766 
0.2 1.4204 1.0024 0.97947 
82 
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